ABSTRACT: This article is a plausibility probe for the significance of international constructivist 'mediating factors' to explain variation in Europeanization outcomes. The article applies a Most Similar Systems Design (or Mill's Method of Difference) to show that the United Kingdom has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France at least partially because it has been the object of stronger socialization pressures within the Nordic Plus Group. The articles contributes to the literature on Europeanization and development cooperation in two important ways. First, it enlarges its scope of analysis, both geographically (beyond new European Union Member States) and thematically (beyond simple measures of aid quality and/or quantity).
Introduction
This article is a plausibility probe for the significance of international constructivist 'mediating factors' to explain variation in Europeanization outcomes. In particular, the article shows that the United Kingdom (UK) has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France at least partially because it has been the object of stronger socialization pressures within the Nordic Plus Group (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, UK and Sweden). Political conditionality is defined as the norm by which aid donors should make the allocation and disbursement of development assistance dependent on respect for fundamental human rights and basic democratic principles by recipient governments.
The article concentrates on France and the UK because, notwithstanding their similar status in world politics (as Member States of the EU, big donors, former colonial empires, nuclear powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), and notwithstanding a formal attempt to coordinate their development policies in Africa (sanctioned by a joint declaration at Saint-Malo in 1998) (Chafer and Cumming 2010a) , the two countries have adopted starkly different approaches to the application of aid sanctions. This situation offers a unique vantage point to test potential intervening variables that can explain the different attitude towards political conditionality by influential EU Member States. The Most Similar Systems Design (or Mill's Method of Difference) suggests to compare cases which are as similar as possible, except with regard to the dependent variable. The ambition is to keep constant the highest possible number of independent variables (Anckar 2008; Yin 2009, 64-67) .
The article contributes to the academic literature on Europeanization and development cooperation in two important ways. First, it enlarges its scope of analysis. Even if recent works have pointed at the limited but discernible role played by the European Commission in coordinating Member
States' development practices (Carbone 2007; Carbone 2010; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012; Orbie 2012) , research on the Europeanization of development cooperation has been very limited so far. Its foundations are sketched in only two book chapters (Bretherton 2013; Orbie and Lightfoot 2014) .
Moreover, researchers have produced only a few empirical studies, limited geographically to new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, and thematically to aspects such as aid quantity, regional focus, tied aid and use of budget support (Horký 2012; Lightfoot 2010; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014; Vittek and Lightfoot 2009 ). This article is the first study ever to deal with the Europeanisation of the development cooperation of EU Member States as old and powerful as France and the UK, and also to concentrate on the issue of political conditionality. In addition, even the most advanced papers so far have not dealt with variation between European donors. For instance, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi explained the similar 'reluctance' that several New Member States (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have shown in approximating their ODA policies to the EU's acquis communautaire in development policy since their accession. Their analysis is not intended to offer a comprehensive comparative study between these countries (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014 (Bache 2006, 232) . The academic literature on Europeanization has already explored a few key "mediating factors" that can help explain variation in the degree of domestic change adjusting to pressure from EU institutions and/or from other EU Member States (Börzel 2005, 53; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001, 11) .
From a rational choice perspective, Europeanisation is facilitated by the absence of multiple veto players and the existence of mediating formal institutions (see, for instance, Haverland 2000) . From a sociological perspective, Europeanisation is assisted by normative resonance with domestic understandings, strong norm entrepreneurs and consensus-oriented decision-making cultures (see, for instance, Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014, 16) .
Against this background, it is rather surprising that little attention has been dedicated to the role of international pressure from other groups or sub-groups of states, within and outside the European Union. For instance, when Swedish and Dutch update their policies, it is plausible that Denmark will find itself under higher pressure than Italy to change its policies too. If Spain changes its behaviour following stimulus from the European Commission, pressure to conform is expected to be higher for Portugal than for Estonia.
The article is structured as follows. The second section compares the two donors on the basis of (1) endorsement of political conditionality in policy documents, and (2) willingness to adopt aid sanctions in response to human rights violations or democratic setbacks. The section shows that the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France. The third section clarifies the international constructivist hypothesis. The main idea is that variation between France and the UK can be at least partially explained by reference to the fact that the two donors belong to different groups of states which do not assign the same level of importance to political conditionality. The last section tests this hypothesis against empirical evidence.
In order to test the hypothesis, information from primary sources (such as independent newspapers' articles, government evaluation reports and diplomatic cables) is triangulated with semi-structured interviews with more than 100 individuals. These individuals were selected because of current or Before proceeding, it is important to specify that this article is a not an Europeanisation study per se. The article compares France and the UK one against the other, without systematically exploring all mechanisms and processes through which European institutions and other EU Member States may have influenced the evolution of French and British development programmes. Yet, the article builds on another study that did take into full account other important elements, such as the influence of realist considerations and domestic politics (de Felice 2015) .
In this light, the article represents a 'plausibility probe', not a fully-fledged test, of the relevance and validity of a new international constructivist hypothesis in the context of Europeanization research (on plausibility probes, see George and Bennett 2005, 75; Levy 2008, 5 ; for an example, see Heupel and Zangl 2010) . This exercise is important because the emphasis of much previous analysis 'has been on the presentation of empirical results as evidence for Europeanization rather than on systematic theory building ' (de Flers and Müller 2012, 24) . Interestingly, political conditionality is not considered appropriate even for budget support operations, albeit this aid modality is unanimously recognized to be increasingly subject to the application of aid sanctions (Hayman 2011; Molenaers 2012) published a "Technical Note on Implementing DFID's strengthened approach to budget support", which affirms that, in considering whether to give budget support or not, it will continue to assess governments against the three commitments mentioned above. In addition, it 'will place more emphasis on domestic accountability by making partner country commitment to strengthening domestic accountability a specific commitment, separating it out from the other commitments, so the commitments will be to:
Variation between France and the UK in the internalization of political conditionality

Policies
1. poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals; 2. respecting human rights and other international obligations; 3. improving public financial management, promoting good governance and transparency and fighting corruption; and 4. strengthening domestic accountability' (DfID 2011, 1).
Behaviour
Academic researchers have recurrently suggested that that, at least since the end of the Cold War, France has been less willing than the UK to apply political conditionality. For example, Uvin found that, in comparison with other major donors, 'the French policy towards political conditionality is much more modest … Generally speaking, its position continues to be one of silent support for the prevailing regimes in its former colonies, whatever their democratic or human rights record' (Uvin 1993, 66) . Cumming concluded his lengthy comparison of French and British aid from the end of the Cold War to 1997 by highlighting that there was 'a radical shift with the introduction of political conditionality'. While the shift has gradually been watered down in both countries, this happened more in France, and 'to a lesser extent' in the UK (Cumming 2001, 340) .
More recent anecdotic evidence consistently supports this view. After the 2009 coup in Madagascar, France was the only Western donor with operations in the country (in contrast with the EU, Germany, Norway and the US) to continue some bilateral government-to-government programmes (Connolly 2013, 6; Dewar, Massey, and Baker 2013, 13; Vivier 2010, 162) (Addison and Laakso 2003, 468; International Crisis Group 2002, 15; Taylor and Williams 2002, 556) . In contrast with the British position, France tried to profit from the retrenchment of other bilateral donors (Chafer 2002, 351; Cilliers 2001, 124; Grebe 2010, 125) .
A significant difference between France and the UK is also confirmed by statistical studies that have investigated whether the human rights performance of potential recipient governments have influenced the decisions of bilateral donors on (a) who their recipient governments should be and (b) how much aid these governments should receive. The large majority of analyses show that human rights and democracy variables have little influence on French aid allocation patterns, and in any case lower influence than on British aid allocation. For instance, Alesina and Dollar found that 'the strongest positive response to democratic institutions is for the U.S., the Dutch, the U.K., the Nordics, and Canada. Of the major donors, France is the one that seems to pay no attention to the democracy of the receiving country' (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 49) . According to Hoeffler and Outram, 'most bilateral donors seem to place little importance on recipient merit ... The UK and Japan are exceptions: they allocate more aid to countries with higher growth, higher democracy scores, and fewer human rights abuses' (Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 237 ; see also Berthélemy 2006; Neumayer 2003 ; the only exception is Carey 2007).
International constructivism: the hypothesis
In contrast with the domestic focus of both rationalist and sociological "mediating factors"
suggested by Europeanization researchers so far, international constructivism concentrates on the foreign dimension. The main argument is that states' behaviour is heavily influenced by the (active as well as involuntary) ideational and social pressures exercised by other international actors (mainly states, international organisations and transnational movements) (Wendt 1999) .
2 The behaviour of states is norm-driven (not goal-oriented), and norms are constructed (as well as deconstructed) through social interaction at the international level (Ruggie 1998) . As highlighted by Brysk, foreign policy can be 'constructed outward. The identities that shape interests are constructed in relation to others' (Brysk 2009, 33) . Finnemore and Sikkink best exemplified this approach through a model of norms' cascade. Once a critical mass of states adopt an international norm, 'states and state élites fashion a political self or identity in relation to the international community', and seek 'legitimation, conformity and esteem' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902-3) On the basis of these insights, international constructivist scholars explain similarities and differences between foreign policies through social processes at the international level: foreign policies are similar when states construct their identities (and therefore adopt the norms dictated by these identities) together with each other; foreign policies are dissimilar when states construct their identities without, or even against, each other (Checkel 1999; Finnemore 1993) . For example,
Rittberger suggests that norms 'emerge in, and are restricted in their validity to, particular regional contexts, producing cross-regional variation in state behaviour' (Rittberger 2004, 25) .
Importantly, even though international constructivism stresses the influence of social pressures at the international level, a distinctive characteristic of this approach is its agnosticism over which social pressures matter most in influencing a specific state's identities, norms and actions. This is a question for empirical research (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001, 110) .
A potential explanation for variation in the extent of Europeanization of political conditionality by
France and the UK is therefore that the two donors belong to different groups of states, inside and/or outside the EU. The hypothesis that will be considered in this article revolves around participation in the Nordic Plus Group (which includes the UK but not France). 
International constructivism: the plausibility probe
The hypothesis that the UK has been at least partially 'socialized' into political conditionality through participation in the Nordic Plus Group faces a two-step test:
1. Nordic countries should have internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than other EU Member States;
2. The UK should have been more amenable than France to social pressure from the Nordic group.
Regarding the first point, there is little doubt that the group of Nordic donors have always set the highest standards in terms of value-based development policies, including the integration of human rights into development programmes and the adoption of aid sanctions against repressive regimes (Stokke 2005, 41) . According to Selbervik and Nyggard, the Nordic countries 'were among the pioneers in linking development aid and human rights' (Selbervik and Nygaard 2006, 26) . Close coordination within the Nordic Plus group offers ample opportunities for both persuasion and imitation. As far as persuasion is concerned, Ingebritsen has already suggested that Scandinavian countries deliberately act as 'norm entrepreneurs' in foreign aid: they have 'consistently and actively sought to influence more powerful states in establishing and strengthening global norms of cooperation' (Ingebritsen 2002, 11) . 3 Herman spoke of the Netherlands as a gidsland, a 'mentor state' (Herman 2006, 863) . Dahl categorized Sweden as a 'moral superpower', a country that sees 'itself as a natural role model in the international community' and takes 'it upon itself to act as a guide to other actors in the system' (Dahl 2006, 897) .
The attempts of Nordic countries to persuade the UK to adopt joint sanctions make perfect sense from the perspective of small states (Thorhallsson 2000; Egeland 1984) . Small states do not possess numerous sources of influence over large organisations like the EU. However, sometime they are able to punch above their weight. As recognized by Panke, 'small states are neither per se political dwarfs nor power-brokers' (Panke 2011, 137) . Two recurrent mechanisms of influence help explain their behaviour in cases of political conditionality. First, small states often try to influence larger players by putting forward arguments that appeal to shared ideas, a strategy which Björkdahl referred to as 'normative framing' (Björkdahl 2007, 140) . Second, small states need to cultivate 'network capital' (Nasra 2011, 168) . The UK is the ideal candidate for coalition-building with powerful actors on the basis of norms and values.
As far as imitation is concerned, Lumsdaine has already argued that 'some countries, such as the Dutch and the Swedes, … consciously see their role in the aid process as one of seeking to set higher standards, to reform and correct the aid process by example' (Lumsdaine 1993, 66) . A UK diplomat confirmed that 'if human rights violations take place, if a coup is staged, it is very likely that one of the first diplomats I would contact would be a Nordic official' (diplomat in Guinea, 11
September 2014).
Importantly, persuasion and emulation of Nordic countries have played an important role at all levels of political conditionality:
1. the adoption of policies, 2. the inclusion of human rights clauses in development agreements, and 3. the application of aid sanctions. Sanctions. Pressure from Nordic donors on British decisions was detected also before specific responses to human rights abuses. In Maputo, the main donor coordination group is the G19.
However, smaller informal groups 'are not a secret to anyone in Mozambique'. The EU is one of these groups, even though 'EU coordination is weak'. The reason is that 'it reproduces the European North/South distinction which is already present within the G19' (diplomat in Maputo, 22
August 2014). The more cohesive group is, again, the informal coordination among Nordic Plus (or 'like-minded') countries. The four Scandinavian countries share the same building, and their coordination is therefore 'logistically' easy. However, they often reach out 'similar agencies, like DfID'. This is perceived to be 'spontaneous' because 'we share the same value'. The diplomat continued:
It is true. The donors which participate in the Nordic Plus Group adopted a similar stance ... during the donor strike ... This is not surprising if you think that we consider ourselves to be obvious collaborators in numerous circumstances (diplomat in Maputo, 4 September 2014).
4
Evidence of Nordic Plus coordination on good governance and human rights issues can be found in other programmes as well. Shortly before 2011, the Nordic Plus donors launched an initiative to strengthen partnerships between donors and civil society organisations. The objective was 'to establish a set of principles for donors to follow to increase civil society capacity at the local level, as well as to improve donor effectiveness and co-ordination between civil society organisations and Nordic Plus donors' (Manning and Malbrough 2012, 14) . Importantly, close coordination between Nordic Plus donors sometimes takes place at the expenses of European coordination. As reported by Delputte and Orbie, Some Nordic Plus interviewees … suggested that more intense EU coordination conflicts with their identity, which corresponds more with 'supporting the principle of multilateralism' than 'being an EU donor'. This opinion also rests on a perception that through EU coordination, the EU Delegations aim to strengthen a common European identity rather than making EU aid more effective (Delputte and Orbie 2014, 11 ).
Delputte and Söderbaum reported that, in Zambia and Tanzania, the Commission suffers from administrative delays and a burdensome hierarchy. Hence, it is the complete opposite of some Nordic Plus donors, who are considered as more flexible agencies: 'by the time the Commission gives the green light, its ideas are already superseded by what we have already agreed in the sectors' (Delputte and Söderbaum 2012, 43) .
Conclusion
While past research has emphasized the significant role played by domestic politics to explain variation in the degree of internalization of political conditionality by EU Member States (de Felice 2015) , this article showed that the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than
France also because it has been the object of stronger socialization pressures within the Nordic Plus
Group.
The article contributes to the expanding literature on the Europeanization of development assistance in two important ways. To begin with, it is one of the few studies ever to explore convergence or divergence in the internalization of political conditionality by EU Member States. So far, research on the Europeanization of development cooperation neglected variation between countries, and focused on other aspects (such as aid quantity, regional focus, tied aid and use of budget support).
Second, the article confirms the plausibility of international constructivist explanations for variation 
